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Christopher L. Cook 
 
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League 
and its Effect on Professional Sports 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The National Football League (NFL), an unincorporated association,1 is a multi-
billion-dollar industry that produces America’s favorite sport, football.2  In 2014, 
ESPN published a survey revealing that professional football is almost three times 
more popular than the next closest professional sport, baseball.3  Professional 
football’s enormous popularity makes it an attractive client, which is why companies 
that are not afforded the opportunity to equally compete for the NFL’s services 
become disgruntled.4  That is exactly what happened in American Needle, Inc. v. 
National Football League (American Needle).5  The NFL entered into an exclusive 
license agreement with Reebok International Ltd. (Reebok), effectively denying 
American Needle, Inc. (American Needle)6 the opportunity to renew its previous 
headwear license.7  American Needle claimed that the NFL and its organizations 
conspired to reach the exclusive license agreement with Reebok in violation of § 1 of 
 
© 2017 Christopher L. Cook 
   J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2017; B.S., George Mason 
University, 2014. All opinions, errors, omissions, and conclusions in this Comment are my own. 
 1.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
730 (2010) (“Since 1920, [the NFL] has existed as an unincorporated 501(c)(6) association of separately owned 
and operated franchises … of varying legal types … that compete in games and in ancillary components of those 
games, such as the hiring of players, coaches, and staff.”). 
 2.  See Terry Keenan, The $45 Billion Reason the NFL Ignores Despicable Behavior, N.Y. POST (Sept. 13, 
2014), http://nypost.com/2014/09/13/the-business-behind-the-nfls-blind-side/ (noting the market value of the 
NFL is forty-five billion dollars). 
 3.  Darren Rovell, NFL Most Popular for 30th Year in Row, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2014), http://espn.go.com/ 
nfl/story/_/id/10354114/harris-poll-nfl-most-popular-mlb-2nd. 
           4.          Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 187 (2010). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  AM. NEEDLE, INC., https://americanneedle.com/history/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 7.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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the Sherman Act.8  The Supreme Court in American Needle held that the NFL was not 
considered a single entity and therefore was within the scope of § 1.9  While the case 
itself came to an anti-climactic conclusion,10 American Needle’s holding has had a 
major impact on professional sports.11 
This case note details the background of the Sherman Act and delves into the 
significance of the holding in American Needle.  While the NFL was the only 
professional sports league mentioned in the opinion,12 its impact extends far beyond 
the limits of the NFL.13  The Court’s narrow interpretation14 of the structure of the 
NFL – viewing each individual team as independent decision-makers, instead of a 
collective unit working together to produce a single product – has changed the 
landscape of professional sports.15   
Part II investigates the background of American Needle, including how the case 
started and the decisions rendered before the case reached the Supreme Court.  Part 
III analyzes the evolution of the Sherman Act and considers what actions fall within 
the scope of § 1.  Part IV focuses on the Court’s decision in American Needle, 
exploring why the Court believed that the NFL was not considered a single entity and 
then describing where the case stands today.  Part V further analyzes the Court’s 
opinion but argues that through a six-factor analysis the NFL should be considered a 
single entity.  Finally, Part VI explores the impact that the Court’s decision has had 
on the landscape of professional sports in the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL.   
 
 8.  Id. “American Needle claimed that the exclusive headwear licensing agreement between NFL Properties 
and Reebok violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, which outlaws any ‘contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade.’” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1).  
 9.  560 U.S. 183, 202–03 (2010). 
 10.  Ken Belson, N.F.L. and American Needle Agree to Settle Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015) (explaining 
that the NFL and American Needle came to an undisclosed settlement).   
 11.  See infra Section VI. 
 12.  The National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL) each filed amicus 
briefs in support of the NFL as they recognized the ramifications that a judgment against the NFL would have. 
See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Basketball Ass’n & NBA Props. in Support of the NFL Respondents’ Response, 
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009), 2009 WL 164243; Brief for Amicus Curiae the 
Nat’l Hockey League in Support of the NFL Respondents, Am. Needle, 129 S. Ct. 2859, 2009 WL 164244 (2009).  
 13.  To illustrate the impact that American Needle has had on professional sports, I will look at cases involving 
professional sports leagues and antitrust issues, specifically in the National Football League (NFL), Major League 
Baseball (MLB), National Basketball Association (NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL). See infra Section 
VI.  
 14.  See infra Section V. 
 15.  James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims After American 
Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 517, 519 (2011). 
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II. THE BACKGROUND: AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. V. NATIONAL 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
The NFL consists of thirty-two separately owned teams.16  Until 1963, each of the 
separately owned teams made its own decisions regarding trademarked items such as 
equipment and apparel.17  The NFL realized that to grow in popularity, the individual 
teams needed to “collectively promote the NFL Brand—that is, the intellectual 
property of the NFL and its member teams—to compete against other forms of 
entertainment.”18  In 1963, the NFL established the National Football League 
Properties (NFLP) to handle all areas of intellectual property and advertising 
campaigns, which aligned the interests of each team to collectively promote the 
NFL.19  The NFLP proceeded to grant nonexclusive licenses, permitting vendors to 
promote and distribute merchandise that contain each team’s individualized logos.20  
One of these vendors, American Needle, was granted a nonexclusive license.21 
American Needle held its nonexclusive license with the NFL until 2000 when each 
team voted to authorize the NFLP to grant exclusive licenses.22  The NFLP 
subsequently granted Reebok an exclusive 10-year license to manufacture NFL 
apparel.23  With Reebok controlling all NFL merchandise, American Needle’s 
nonexclusive license was not renewed.24 
American Needle filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois alleging that 
the exclusive agreement between the NFL and Reebok violated §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act.25  The NFL argued that it was a single entity, and therefore “immune 
from liability” under § 1.26  The Northern District of Illinois agreed and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the NFL.27  The court explained that the NFL’s 
regulation of intellectual property and collective licensing agreement served to 
promote the NFL as a whole.28  Through collective licensing, the individual NFL 
teams acted as one economic unit making them a single entity outside the scope of § 
1.29  
 
 16.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Am. Needle, Inc., 538 F.3d at 738. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Am. Needle, Inc., 538 F.3d at 738. 
 27.  Id. at 739. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
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American Needle immediately appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed 
the decision rendered by the Northern District of Illinois.30  The Seventh Circuit 
limited the scope of its review to the specific licensing of individual teams’ intellectual 
property and its relationship to the NFL.31  In order to uphold the District Court’s 
decision and avoid scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the NFL would have to be 
considered a “single entity.”32  To “mak[e] a single entity determination, courts must 
examine whether the conduct in question deprives the marketplace of the 
independent sources of economic control that competition assumes.”33  The Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Illinois’ holding34 that § 1 did not apply to 
the NFL and its individually owned teams because they do not suppress economic 
competition.35  The Seventh Circuit’s decision was later reversed by the Supreme 
Court and remanded back to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether there was an 
antitrust violation under § 1 of the Sherman Act.36  
III.  ANTITRUST LAW 
The Sherman Act was developed and passed in 1890 as Congress’ first attempt to limit 
the prevalence of monopolies in America.37  The main objective with its creation was 
“to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure 
there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently.”38  Those who are 
found in violation of the Sherman Act face civil liability as well as criminal 
prosecution by the Department of Justice.39  
The litigation in American Needle centered upon § 1 of the Sherman Act.40  The 
language of § 1 states: 
 
 30.  Id. at 744. 
 31.  Am. Needle, Inc., 538 F.3d at 742. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. at 737. 
 35.  Id. at 744. The Seventh Circuit denied that the NFL was within the scope of § 1 for three reasons. First, 
the NFL must function as a single entity to produce football games, which is the hallmark of the NFL. Id. at 743. 
Second, the NFL teams are not competitors but share an economic interest to promote the NFL. Id. Finally, the 
court emphasized that the history of collectively licensing intellectual property uninterrupted since 1963 leads to 
the conclusion that the NFL is a single entity. Id. at 744. 
 36.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010). 
 37.  B. Zorina Khan, Antitrust and Innovation Before the Sherman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 783 (2011). 
 38.  F.T.C, The Antitrust Laws, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/antitrust-laws.  
 39.  Id. Although, criminal prosecutions are usually limited to severe violations that are intentional such as 
price fixing. Id.  
 40.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 189 (noting the only issue to decide was whether the NFL fell within the 
scope of § 1).  
Cook PP v3 (Do Not Delete) 4/6/2017  3:28 PM 
 Christopher L. Cook 
Vol. 12, No. 2 2017 301 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make 
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared 
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, 
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, 
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.41 
The purpose of § 1, if read literally, is to prevent “[e]very contract, combination . 
. . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”42  Many courts have turned away from such a 
literal view of § 1, as it would cover the “entire body of private contract law.”43  
Congress, in the late 19th Century, did not intend for the provision to have such an 
expansive coverage.44  The Court’s modified interpretation of § 1 is exemplified in 
Texaco v. Dagher, where the Court refused to take a literal approach to the explicit 
language of § 1, and instead recognized that “Congress intended to outlaw 
only unreasonable restraints.”45  Later in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., the Supreme Court held that the intent of the parties to dominate the market 
was the focus of the concerted action question.46  
A.  What is Considered a Concerted Action? 
Concerted action is an “action which is planned, arranged, and agreed on by parties 
acting together to further or fulfill some plan or cause.”47  The “distinction between 
concerted and independent action” is the type of trade restraint that § 1 was invoked 
to enforce.48  An independent action, unlike concerted action, is not enforceable 
under a § 1 analysis because a single entity’s actions are only unlawful where it 
“threatens actual monopolization.”49  For a contract or conspiracy to fall within the 
limited coverage of § 1, it must deal with a concerted action that unreasonably 
restrains interstate or foreign trade or commerce.50   
 
 41.  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); see Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 
1, 1–2 (2006) (refusing to take a literal approach to the language of 15 U.S.C. § 1). 
 44.  See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (narrowing the literal scope of 15 U.S.C. § 1 to the long-
recognized intention of Congress to outlaw only unreasonable restraints). 
 45.  Texaco, 547 U.S. at 2. 
 46.  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767–69 (1984). 
 47.  Concerted Action Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/concerted-action. 
 48.  Monsato Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). 
 49.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767. 
 50.  Id. at 767, 768–69. 
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Concerted action, which has previously been held to cover parties that are legally 
distinct entities, now focuses less on the interconnectivity of the parties and more on 
the parties’ intent to dominate the market.51  The relevant inquiry in a concerted 
action question is whether parties are using their agreement to deprive “the 
marketplace of independent centers of decision making,” effectively stifling 
competition.52  As illustrated in Copperweld, the Supreme Court held that a parent 
corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with each 
other in a concerted action because they are controlled by a single decision-maker 
placing it outside the scope of § 1 of the Sherman Act.53  The congregation of 
“independent centers of decision-making” to prevent competitors from enjoying free 
competition in the marketplace is the type of violation that the Sherman Act seeks to 
prevent.54  
Regardless of whether parties are considered legally distinct entities or not, the 
Sherman Act prohibits any concerted action in restraint of trade or commerce.55  The 
Supreme Court, in United States v. Sealy, Inc. (Sealy), ruled that a group of mattress 
manufacturers, Sealy licensees, who owned substantially all of Sealy, Inc.’s stock, 
conspired in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.56  These licensees came to an 
agreement with each other to fix minimum retail prices and agreed to only operate 
in certain geographic areas.57  The Supreme Court held the concerted activity of the 
individual manufacturers was in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act even though they 
were legally considered a single entity.58   
Similarly, in NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma (Regents), the Court 
held that the horizontal pricing agreement to restrict collegiate football programs 
from obtaining individual television contracts “place[d] an artificial limit on the 
quantity of televised football that is available to broadcasters and consumers.”59  The 
NCAA and its sub-committee, in a concerted action, came to an agreement to 
implement a plan to limit collegiate football programs’ ability to obtain independent 
television contracts.60  The Court viewed this proposed plan by the NCAA and its sub-
 
 51.  See id. at 768–69, 777 (holding that a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary are “incapable of conspiring 
with each other” for § 1 purposes, even though they are separate legal entities). While a parent and its subsidiary 
are “separate” for incorporation purposes, they are controlled by a single center of decision-making and have the 
same economic purposes. Id. at 771, 777. 
 52.  Id. at 769. 
 53.  Id. at 771, 777. 
 54.  Id. at 769. 
 55.  See generally United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357–58 (1967) (holding that Sealy and its licensees 
were part of a price fixing scheme in violation of the Sherman Act). 
 56.  Id. at 356–57. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 357–58. 
 59.  468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984).  
 60.  Id.  
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committee as an attempt at price fixing, which had an anticompetitive effect on the 
marketplace.61  Ultimately, the Court illustrated that the NCAA was not a single 
entity, and therefore was within the scope of § 1 of the Sherman Act.62  This was based 
on the idea that each College Football Association (CFA) member is in competition 
with one another, competing on and off the field for student-athletes and sponsors.63  
Justice Stevens’ decision was a precursor for the decision in American Needle and 
further illustrated the distinctions between classes of violations under § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.64 
B.  Per Se Violations and the Rule of Reason 
Violations under the Sherman Act are categorized as either per se violations or 
violations under the rule of reason.65  A per se violation is one that requires little 
explanation – it is automatically illegal.66  The Supreme Court has defined a limited 
number of circumstances that are per se illegal and are therefore violations of the 
Sherman Act, such as price fixing, collusive bidding, and group boycotts.67  The most 
prominent of those examples is an explicit agreement to fix prices.68  The Supreme 
Court, as stated in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., looks at any situation that 
involves price fixing to be an illegal activity and subject to an automatic violation of 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.69   
When the facts surrounding a case do not fall within the limited circumstances of 
a per se violation, the court reviews the case under the rule of reason.70  In these 
circumstances, the court applies a totality of the circumstances approach.71  
The first step in the rule of reason analysis is for the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
there is a restraint on competition, which has produced or will produce an 
 
 61.  Id. at 104. 
 62.  Id. at 120. 
 63.  Id. at 99. 
 64.  Id. at 10004 (explaining the distinction between per se violations and violations under the rule of 
reason).  Regents was decided under the rule of reason due to the Court’s evaluation of the unique circumstances 
that accompany the NCAA and its placement to maintain college football as an amateur sport. Id. 
 65.  Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust.  
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust; see, e.g., United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 155 (1940) (concluding that price fixing unreasonably restricts trade and 
therefore is a violation of the Sherman Act). 
 68.  Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust. 
 69.  446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980). According to the Supreme Court, it is irrelevant whether the agreement to fix 
prices is reasonable. Id.  
 70.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 203. The rule of reason is implemented by “the factfinder weigh[ing] all of 
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.” Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 71.  Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust. 
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anticompetitive effect.72  Regents provides an example of how a plaintiff can meet its 
burden of proof.73  In Regents, an NCAA committee developed a plan to reduce the 
impact that live television has on collegiate football game attendance.74  The plan 
provided that collegiate football programs could only negotiate with two networks: 
American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and Columbia Broadcasting System 
(CBS).75  The members of the CFA felt restricted and wanted the ability to negotiate 
with any network; more specifically, they wanted to enter into a lucrative contract 
with National Broadcasting Co. (NBC).76  
Although the restraints of price fixing placed upon CFA members would 
ordinarily be a per se violation, the Court explained that “it would be inappropriate 
to apply a per se rule… [where it] involves an industry in which horizontal restraints 
on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.”77  Instead, the 
plaintiffs turned to three specific areas where the NCAA’s plan would produce an 
anticompetitive effect: (1) the plan fixed prices for specific telecasts; (2) network 
contracts essentially eliminated the CFA members’ ability to negotiate with other 
networks; and (3) the plan created an “artificial limit on the production of televised 
college football.”78  The CFA members’ ability to show the NCAA’s power over both 
intercollegiate sports and television programming and how its plan restrained market 
prices and output demonstrated an anticompetitive effect.79 
Once the plaintiff has met his or her burden of proof, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to justify why this situation promotes, rather than inhibits, competition.80  
The defendant must only provide a plausible justification for the restraint on 
competition in the marketplace.81 
If the defendant meets his or her burden, the burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary or that it can be 
 
 72.  Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule of Reason: From Balancing to Burden Shifting, 1 Antitrust Law Journal 
2 (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/at303000_ 
ebulletin_20130122.authcheckdam.pdf; see, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (restraining members’ freedom to contract with different broadcast stations proved 
to be an anticompetitive effect). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 91–94. 
 75.  Id. at 92–93. 
 76.  Id. at 94–95. 
 77.  Id. at 100–01. 
 78.  Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 96, 98–100. 
 79.  Id. at 104.  
 80.  Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule of Reason: From Balancing to Burden Shifting, 1 ANTITRUST L.J. 2 (Jan. 
22, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/at303000_ebulletin_ 
20130122.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 81.  Id.  
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achieved in a less restrictive manner.82  Where the plaintiff is unable to show a less 
restrictive alternative or that the restriction was not reasonably necessary, the court 
looks to a balancing approach to consider whether the anticompetitive effects 
outweigh the pro-competitive effects.83  According to a study done by the American 
Bar Association, approximately 90% of the 300 rule of reason cases decided in the last 
15 years found that the “plaintiff failed to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive 
effect.”84  Thus, in cases that are not considered per se violations, the plaintiff often 
faces an uphill battle to prove that the defendant’s actions unreasonably restrain 
market competition. 
There are instances where the court does not require a full rule of reason analysis.85  
This is often referred to as a “quick look analysis.”86  This quick look analysis may 
apply in situations where no justification exists for the opposing party to prove that 
its actions promote competition.87 
The Court in American Needle limited its decision to whether the NFL was a single 
entity and then remanded the case back to the Seventh Circuit to discern whether a 
§ 1 violation existed under the rule of reason.88  
IV. THE CASE: AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE 
American Needle is unique because it involved thirty-two individually owned teams 
that collectively make the NFL a consistent revenue-generating enterprise.89  The 
main controversy involved the NFL’s use of a separate entity to handle all areas of 
intellectual property, the NFLP.90  The purpose of the NFLP was to align the interests 
of the individually owned NFL teams and force the owners to have equity in the 
decisions that were being made collectively as a league in regard to intellectual 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims After American 
Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 539 (2011). 
 84.  Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule of Reason: From Balancing to Burden Shifting, 1 ANTITRUST L.J. 2 (Jan. 
22, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/at303000_ebulletin_ 
20130122.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 85.  Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 86.  Id. “In each of these cases, which have formed the basis for what has come to be called abbreviated or 
‘quick-look’ analysis under the rule of reason, an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics 
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and 
markets.” Id. 
 87.  Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770; James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports 
Antitrust Claims After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 531 (2011). 
 88.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010). 
 89.  See infra Part V. 
 90.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 187. 
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property.91  The landmark decision in American Needle set a precedent for 
professional sports leagues moving forward that the NFL is not a single entity.92 
A.  Supreme Court’s Reasoning 
In American Needle, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit93 
and held that the NFL is not a single entity.94  The Supreme Court adopted the 
framework set out in Copperweld, which stated that the concerted action question is 
not exclusive to legally distinct entities.95  The Court avoided such “formalistic 
distinctions in favor of a functional consideration of the parties,” focusing on 
whether an agreement joins together independent decision-makers.96   
Justice Stevens relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Regents97 and Sealy98 to 
conclude that the NFL is not a single entity.99  Justice Stevens used these cases to 
illustrate that the Court has “repeatedly found instances in which members of a 
legally [distinct] entity violated § 1 when the entity was controlled by a group of 
competitors.”100  These cases were similar to American Needle in that they detailed a 
group of potential competitors coming together for a single cause and effectively 
extinguishing competition in the marketplace.101  Ultimately, the key determination 
was whether the alleged conduct of the NFL joined together separate decision-
makers.102   
In its analysis, the Court looked at the differences between a parent-subsidiary 
relationship versus joint conduct.103  The Court illustrated that a parent and its wholly 
owned subsidiary cannot violate § 1 of the Sherman Act because they are incapable 
of conspiring with one another.104  The reason that such a structure can avoid § 1 is 
because of the centralization of decision-making authority.105  The subsidiaries are 
controlled by the authority of the parent who makes decisions that the subsidiaries 
 
 91.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
731–32 (2010). 
 92.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 201. 
 93.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 94.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 186. 
 95.  Id. at 189, 191. 
 96.  Id. at 191. 
 97.  468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 98.  388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
 99.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 191–92, 20203. 
 100.  Id. at 191. 
 101.  Id. at 19192. 
 102.  Id. at 195. 
 103.  Id. at 194. 
 104.  Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 194. 
 105.  Id. 
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follow.106  Conversely, joint conduct from separate decision-makers to suppress 
market competition is the conduct that § 1 was created to prevent.107  The Court 
viewed the individual NFL teams as separate decision-makers rather than a single 
entity working together to create a unified product.108    
According to the Court, the NFL does “not possess either the unitary decision-
making quality or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic of 
independent action.”109  The Court recognized that the NFL is a single entity in some 
aspects such as building the NFL brand, but not here.110  According to the Court, each 
individual NFL team is a “separate, profit-maximizing entity.”111  The Court likened 
the surrounding facts to a football game itself, and emphasized that just as football 
teams compete against one another on the field, for fans and tickets, they also 
compete for intellectual property.112  The licensing of each team’s valuable trademark 
creates competition for its individual services, not for the common interests of the 
league itself.113   
The Court rejected the NFL’s argument that because the NFL teams share 
revenues as a single unit, they should be considered a single entity.114  The Court stated 
that if potential competitors could evade § 1 scrutiny by merely sharing profits, then 
any cartel could evade antitrust law.115  Competitors cannot simply create an end-
around § 1 of the Sherman Act by “acting through a third-party intermediary or joint 
venture.”116 
The Court acknowledged that NFL teams do share an interest in creating a 
successful league, which requires a host of collective decision-making,117 but the 
conduct at issue in American Needle exemplified that the NFL teams were acting as 
“separate economic actors pursing separate economic interests” to license individual 
 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id. at 194–95. 
 108.  Id. at 196–97. 
 109.  Id. at 196. 
 110.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 198, 200–02 (illustrating the perception that the NFL is a single entity 
because of its shared profits structure).  The Court further explains that if profit sharing between parties shows a 
commonality of interest to exclude scrutiny under § 1, then all cartels could evade antitrust laws because all cartels 
have some form of commonality of interest. Id. at 200–02. 
 111.  Id. at 198.  
 112.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 19697. 
 113.  Id. at 197. 
 114.  Id. at 201. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 202 (quoting Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 336 (2d Cir. 
2008)). 
 117.  See Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 202 (justifying the NFL’s single entity status as they “must cooperate in 
the production and scheduling of games” to ensure the NFL’s success); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 
250 (1996) (holding that the NFL is a single entity in dealing with collective bargaining activity). 
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intellectual property.118  As a result, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision.119 
B.  Where Does the Case Stand Today? 
After the Supreme Court issued its decision, the case was remanded back to the 
Seventh Circuit for a judgment to be issued on whether the NFL’s exclusive license 
was in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.120  The Supreme Court instructed the 
Seventh Circuit to judge the case under the rule of reason121 because American Needle 
did not fall within the limited number of circumstances that the Court has declared 
to be a per se violation.122  Unfortunately, the rule of reason has yet to be applied to 
the NFL as the parties came to an undisclosed settlement in 2015.123 
V. THE NFL IS A SINGLE ENTITY, AND THUS, OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF § 1 
OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
While American Needle’s holding that the NFL is not a single entity remains good law, 
there is an argument to be made that the NFL should be considered a single entity.124  
Each of the following factors provides substantial evidence that the NFL is a single 
entity: (1) treatment of similarly structured entities outside of professional sports; (2) 
the evolution of the single entity defense applied in professional sports; (3) the source 
of value for each individual NFL trademark; (4) the impracticality of individually 
negotiating contracts with each specific team; (5) the NFL’s collective decision-
making model; and (6) the NFL’s longstanding tradition of licensing its intellectual 
property since 1963.    
 
 118.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 197. 
 119.  Id. at 201. 
 120.  Id. at 204. 
 121.  Id. at 203. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Ken Belson, N.F.L. and American Needle Agree to Settle Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/sports/football/nfl-and-american-needle-agree-to-settle-lawsuit.html. 
While the practical importance of this decision remains as both Nike and New Era both share exclusive apparel 
licensing rights to the NFL trademarks, American Needle likely saw that the expense for continued litigation on 
remand did not outweigh the benefit to recover the undisclosed settlement amount. Marc Edelman, American 
Needle Settles Antitrust Lawsuit With the NFL, Preventing An Important Sports Law Trial, FORBES, 1 (Mar. 3, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2015/03/03/american-needle-settles-antitrust-lawsuit-with-the-nfl-
preventing-an-important-sports-law-trial/#6806342f74f7. 
 124.  See Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 202 (justifying the NFL’s single entity status as they “must cooperate in 
the production and scheduling of games” to ensure the NFL’s success); Brown 518 U.S. at 250 (holding that the 
NFL is a single entity in dealing with collective bargaining activity).  
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A.  Treatment of Similarly Structured Entities Outside of Professional Sports 
Fast-food franchises, like professional sports leagues, have leaned on the single entity 
defense to avoid scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act.125  These franchises are 
similarly structured to NFL teams as they both operate under the umbrella of a larger 
corporate structure, but at times work to further their own interests.126  While some 
courts have allowed the single entity defense to be applied to franchises, others have 
not.127  
In the 1993 case, Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada (I.B. Fischer Nevada), a store 
manager alleged that a no-switching clause in a franchise agreement between the 
franchisor of Jack-in-the-Box restaurants and the franchisee violated § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.128  The no-switching clause stated that the parties could not offer 
employment to a manager of another Jack-in-the-Box within six months of 
termination without a waiver from the previous owner.129  The court upheld the single 
entity defense by looking at the commonality of interests between the franchisor and 
franchisee.130 
The court agreed that because each franchise “serves substantially the same 
products; the products are served to the public in the same manner; the franchisor 
develops products and services for all franchises; the employees dress alike; the décor 
of each franchise is similar; and the franchises are advertised as a single enterprise 
with a single logo” there is no competition between the parties.131  This structure is a 
mutually beneficial relationship where, like the NFL, both parties grow by working 
together to produce a uniform product that is consumed by the public.132 The 
franchisees, like individual NFL teams, prosper because of the use of the franchisor’s 
logo as consumers know and trust the reputation that comes along with it.133  The 
franchisor, like the NFL itself, is then able to collect more royalties as the franchisees 
grow in popularity reaching more people.134  
 
 125.  Barry M. Block, Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise Systems After American Needle, 
30 FRANCHISE L.J. 216, 217–19 (2011). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See, e.g., Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1985) (illustrating 
that franchises can be subject to § 1 scrutiny); but see Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 999 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding that a fast-food franchise was considered a single entity).  
 128.  999 F.2d at 447. 
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Williams v. Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (D. Nev. 1992).  
 132.  Barry M. Block, Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise Systems After American Needle, 
30 FRANCHISE L.J. 216, 220 (2011). 
 133.  Id. at 218. 
 134.  Id. 
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In addition to Jack-in-the-Box, another fast-food franchise, Burger King, faced a 
§ 1 claim.135  In 1995, it was alleged that a franchisor had conspired with Caucasian 
franchisees to limit the opportunities for minorities.136  While the court found no 
evidence of racial prejudice, it did state that the claim would nonetheless fail because 
the franchisor and its franchisees are “incapable of conspiring with each other.”137  
This ruling – that fast-food franchises can successfully evade § 1 scrutiny – was 
echoed in a 2005 case involving the McDonald’s corporation.138  
Although numerous courts have allowed franchises to evade antitrust scrutiny, 
there have been some who have disagreed.139  One example was Motive Parts 
Warehouse v. Facet Enterprises.140  In this case, the Tenth Circuit found that a 
franchisor and franchisee could be capable of conspiring with respect to the prices 
that were to be paid by warehouse distributors who were in competition with the 
franchisees.141  The ability of the franchisor to create a horizontal restraint on 
competition in the marketplace to the benefit of its franchisees negated the use of the 
single entity defense and subjected them to liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act.142  
Part of the single entity defense is whether there are “separate economic actors 
pursuing separate economic interests.”143  The Court in American Needle stated that 
while NFL teams seek to promote a unified product on the field, they pursue separate 
economic interests off the field as they are in competition over fans, sales, and use of 
its trademarks.144  This structure is like franchisor-franchisee agreements as they have 
a common interest in promoting the franchisor’s brand, but then franchisees are 
competing with each other for revenue generated by paying customers.145   
The court in I.B. Fischer Nevada permitted the single entity defense because of the 
centralized control the franchisor exerted over the franchisee’s operations.146  This is 
like the NFL as the league controls the production of the on-field product and each 
 
 135.  Hall v. Burger King Corp., 912 F. Supp. 1509, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1995). 
 136.  Id. at 1517, 1548. 
 137.  Id. at 1548. 
 138.  Abbouds’ McDonald’s, LLC v. McDonald’s Corp., No. CV04-1895P, 2005 WL 2656591, at *7 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 14, 2005) (holding that the plaintiff did not have antitrust standing to pursue a § 1 claim against 
McDonalds).  
 139.  See, e.g., Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1985) (allowing 
franchises to be subject to § 1 scrutiny).  
 140.  774 F.2d 380, 388 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984). 
 144.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 196–98 (2010). 
 145.  Barry M. Block & Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise Systems After American Needle, 
30 FRANCHISE L.J. 216, 218–19 (2011). 
 146.  999 F.2d 445, 447–48 (9th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (D. Nev. 1992). 
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team has a unified interest to grow the NFL-brand as a centralized group.147  While 
the Court’s opinion in American Needle would distinguish the two by stating that 
each NFL team controls its own operations in regard to intellectual property,148 
looking at the collective nature by which decisions are made by the NFLP and the 
unified interests of promoting a uniform product on the field, they are more similar 
than the Court believes.149  
Fast-food franchises are not exact replicas of the NFL, but they do share similar 
characteristics.150  As demonstrated above, courts have applied the single entity 
defense to fast-food franchises evidencing that the NFL, a similarly structured entity, 
should be able to successfully use the defense as well.  
B.  Evolution of the Single Entity Defense Applied in Professional Sports 
Not only has the single entity defense been asserted outside of professional sports, 
but it has also been applied in professional sports.151  One of the first cases in which a 
professional sports league asserted the defense was in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 
Commission v. NFL, where the Oakland Raiders asserted that the NFL unlawfully 
restrained its ability to relocate to Los Angeles.152  The court acknowledged that while 
there is a commonality of interest between teams, each are independent business 
entities, and thus, not a single entity.153  The court discounted the fact that 90% of 
league revenues are divided equally among the individual teams.154  While NFL teams 
have some divergent interests,155 those divergent interests would not be a source of 
significant value without its association with the NFL.156  
A few years after the decision in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. 
NFL, the NFL asserted the same defense as they sought to prevent the owner of the 
New England Patriots from raising money through a stock offering on the public 
market.157  The court ruled in favor of the NFL but for reasons beyond recognizing 
 
 147.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
730–33 (2010). 
 148.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 201. 
 149.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
731–33 (2010). 
 150.  See supra notes 131–34, 143–49 and accompanying text. 
 151.  E.g., McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 878 (D. Minn. 1992). 
 152.  726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 153.  Id. at 1389–90. 
 154.  Id. at 1390.  
 155. See id. (illustrating examples of divergent interests such as ticket sales, players, and management 
personnel). 
 156.  E.g., Matthew Rocco, TV Deals Boost NFL Revenue to New Record, FOX BUSINESS (Jul. 21, 2015), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/07/21/tv-deals-boost-nfl-revenue-to-new-record.html.  
 157.  Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1095–96, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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the NFL as a single entity.158  The First Circuit explicitly stated that the NFL and its 
member clubs compete off the field, preventing the single entity defense from being 
applicable.159  
Furthermore, in his decision in Regents, Justice Stevens held that the NCAA is not 
a single entity, but its applicability to American Needle is distinguishable.160  The 
NCAA consists of individual universities that exist independent of the NCAA.161  The 
collegiate football programs of those universities exist to benefit its parent, the 
university, not the NCAA.162  The parent-subsidiary relationship that universities 
have with its football programs is directly comparable to the NFL and its thirty-two 
teams that exist to benefit the collective group – the NFL.163   
While the Seventh Circuit’s decision in American Needle declaring the NFL to be 
a single entity was a departure from previous circuit court rulings,164 there have been 
decisions indicating that courts have viewed the NFL as a single entity prior to the 
2010 decision.165  Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. (Brown) involved a dispute over a 
pending collective bargaining revision in which the NFL unilaterally implemented 
modifications to player contracts after an agreement could not be reached.166  The 
Supreme Court held that the NFL resembled a “single bargaining employer” as it 
related to its individual teams.167  Although the Court limited the application of this 
decision to collective bargaining activities, the fact that its holding is limited is not 
dispositive.168  Brown provides evidence that the Supreme Court saw the NFL in terms 
of a single entity but limited its decision to avoid an over-expansive application of its 
holding.169  
Additionally, more recent cases have looked favorably upon the single entity 
defense as applied to other professional sports leagues.170  The Seventh Circuit stated 
that the NBA was considered a single entity when selling broadcast rights but a joint 
 
 158.  Id. at 1099. 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
745 (2010). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  M. Scott LeBlanc, American Needle, Inc. v. NFL: Professional Sports Leagues and “Single-Entity” Antitrust 
Exemption, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 148, 149 (2010). 
 165.  See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996). 
 166.  Id. at 234–35. 
 167.  Id. at 249. 
 168.  Id. at 250. 
 169.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
744–45 (2010). 
 170.  See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 52, 58 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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venture when competing for player acquisitions.171  Judge Easterbrook, in his opinion, 
asserted that “the NBA is best understood as one firm when selling broadcast rights 
to a network in competition with a thousand other producers of entertainment.”172  
NFL teams, like the NBA, “are not completely independent economic competitors, 
as they depend upon a degree of cooperation” to compete against other forms of 
entertainment; this cooperation is vital to continue to generate value.173 
C.  The Value of Each Trademark  
NFL team logos are unquestionably valuable.174  The NFL’s most recognizable team, 
the Dallas Cowboys, is valued at $4.2 billion while the Buffalo Bills, the least valuable 
NFL team, is still worth $1.5 billion.175  With the popularity of the NFL and the net 
worth of each of its individual teams, it is easy to see the logic in Justice Stevens’ 
argument that the teams are “potentially competing suppliers of valuable 
trademarks.”176 
The NFL is a $45 billion industry177 with annual revenues projected to jump to $25 
billion by 2025.178  It is no secret that the NFL is the biggest name around.179  The use 
of the NFL’s “shield” symbolizes more than just a logo; it is a symbol that is bigger 
than any one team, and the reason why each of the thirty-two teams are worth more 
than $1 billion.180  Market competitors, such as American Needle, have litigated to 
compete for the teams’ trademarks solely because of their association with the NFL 
as a single entity.181   
Professional football could plausibly be produced outside of the NFL if teams 
wanted to disband, as evidenced by the United States Football League (USFL), but it 
would be difficult for those teams to sustain substantial value over a period of more 
 
 171.  Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248 (1996). 
 174.  Sports Money: 2016 NFL Valuations, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/list.  
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 197 (2010) (emphasizing because of the 
significant value each NFL team’s trademark produces, apparel companies should be given the opportunity to 
compete). 
 177.  Terry Keenan, The $45 Billion Reason the NFL Ignores Despicable Behavior, N.Y. POST (Sept. 13, 2014, 
10:51 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/09/13/the-business-behind-the-nfls-blind-side. 
 178.  Howard Bloom, NFL Revenue-Sharing Model Good for Business, SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2014-09-05/nfl-revenue-sharing-television-contracts-2014-season-
business-model-nba-nhl-mlb-comparison-salary-cap. 
 179.  Terry Keenan, The $45 Billion Reason the NFL Ignores Despicable Behavior, N.Y. POST (Sept. 13, 2014, 
10:51 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/09/13/the-business-behind-the-nfls-blind-side. 
 180.  Sports Money: 2016 NFL Valuations, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/list. 
 181.  Emphasis added. Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 187. 
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than a few years.182  The USFL was a viable professional football league for a period of 
three years.183  After that, the USFL tried to directly compete with the NFL by 
changing from a spring schedule to a fall schedule.184  This backfired and along with 
teams changing locations and the lack of financial stability due to uncontrolled 
spending by USFL owners, the USFL was effectively extinguished.185  The USFL could 
not withstand the popularity and presence of the NFL, which has only grown further 
as time has passed.186  
Currently, the NFL dominates the media market as its popularity is as strong as it 
has ever been.187  The magnitude of the media rights deals that television networks 
have agreed to illustrates the value that our society places on the NFL and its on-field 
product.188  Individual teams who seek to disband from the NFL would face 
substantial difficulties promoting their brand beyond local markets and obtaining 
national recognition, which generates substantial revenue from marketing 
campaigns, merchandise sales, and collectively negotiated media deals.189 
D.  Individually Negotiated Contracts 
Most companies, like American Needle, are not interested in negotiating individual 
contracts with each team but instead are seeking a league-wide license for all thirty-
two teams because of their association with the NFL.190  The Supreme Court suggests 
that an apparel company should have to contract individually with each of the thirty-
two NFL teams separately to use its trademark.191 
Much of the net worth for each NFL team is not derived from ticket sales, 
merchandise, or any other individual sales directly tied to consumers; rather, it is due 
to lucrative media rights deals that the NFL has negotiated on behalf of the entire 
 
 182.  About the USFL, UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.usfl.info (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Matthew Rocco, TV Deals Boost NFL Revenue to New Record, FOX BUSINESS (Jul. 21, 2015), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/07/21/tv-deals-boost-nfl-revenue-to-new-record.html. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  NYU Stern School of Business, The Dallas Cowboys: Are they America’s team? The first $5 billion sports 
franchise ever?, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/Valuation 
ofweek/cowboys.htm.  
 190.  See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 187 (2010) (illustrating the reason 
American Needle sued the NFL – because the NFLP granted Reebok an exclusive licensing agreement for all thirty-
two NFL teams).   
 191.  See id. at 197 (explaining that each company should have to negotiate individual contracts). 
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league.192  In 2014, each NFL team received an equal share of the $7.3 billion revenue 
generated, which equates to $226.4 million per team.193  Of that $7.3 billion, 
approximately $3.1 billion came from media rights deals with CBS, NBC, Fox, 
ABC/ESPN, and the NFL Network.194  This is a direct result of each team’s association 
with the NFL.  Whether each NFL team would be worthless if they were not associated 
with the NFL could be debated, but what cannot be debated is the significant value 
that each NFL team generates because of its association under the NFL’s “shield” and 
the media recognition that comes along with it.195   
While it is true that each team is its own entity in some capacities, its relationship 
to the NFL as a whole should be viewed more as a parent and subsidiary relationship 
instead of entirely separate ventures.196  The negotiation of individual contracts is 
synonymous with how collegiate football is structured with schools such as Auburn 
and South Carolina being sponsored by Under Armour while schools like Alabama 
and Oregon are affiliated with Nike.197  The distinction between the NCAA and the 
NFL is that collegiate athletics are an amateur sport structured much differently than 
the NFL.198  The collegiate football programs mentioned above generate significant 
amounts of revenue but that revenue is not to better the NCAA as an organization; 
instead, it is to benefit the university with whom they are affiliated.199  The football 
programs and the universities, not the NCAA, have a parent-subsidiary relationship 
as “the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent.”200  In professional sports, 
however, it is the league that enjoys the parent-subsidiary relationship with its teams 
as their collective revenues are pooled together for the betterment of the entire NFL 
 
 192.  Darren Rovell, NFL Teams Each Earn $226.4M From National Revenue Sharing, ESPN (Jul. 22, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/13290743/green-bay-packers-financial-records-reveal-2264m-nfl-revenue-
sharing.  
 193.  Matthew Rocco, TV Deals Boost NFL Revenue to New Record, FOX BUSINESS (Jul. 21, 2015), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2015/07/21/tv-deals-boost-nfl-revenue-to-new-record.html. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). 
 197.  Matt Halfhill, Brand Breakdown: 2013 College Football Teams (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www. 
nicekicks.com/2013/08/29/brand-breakdown-2013-college-football-teams. 
 198.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
745 (2010). 
 199.  Id. During the 2015-16 school year, the University of Alabama reported $103,870,999 in revenue 
generated by its football program. See The University of Alabama, Equity in Athletics Data Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ. (2016), https://ope.ed.gov/athletics/#/institution/search (providing users the ability to sort through various 
collegiate athletic department’s revenues and expenses). 
 200.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
745 (2010); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 752 (1984). 
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and then re-distributed to the teams as part of its revenue sharing plan.201  As stated 
in Copperweld, a parent’s relationship with its subsidiary is considered a single entity 
and beyond the scope of § 1.202 
E.  Collective Decision-Making Model 
Each of the thirty-two NFL teams owns a share of the NFLP.203  When making binding 
decisions for the NFL, the NFLP usually must obtain a majority vote from its 
members to implement a change.204  Thus, the collective decision-making model 
implemented by the NFL promotes unity amongst the individual teams as each team 
has a say in league-wide changes.205   
However, the Court in American Needle viewed this type of collective decision-
making as evidence that the individual NFL teams were actual or potential 
competitors in the licensing of intellectual property.206  The Court stated that the NFL 
could not manipulate its structure by creating the NFLP, which would essentially act 
as a corporate shell to avoid antitrust scrutiny.207  Looking deeper into Justice Stevens’ 
analysis, if the NFL could have avoided § 1 liability by outsourcing licensing decisions 
to a third party, collective negotiating would be legal as long as participants 
transferred negotiating power to a third party and did not communicate directly with 
each other.208  This is the type of end-around that the Court wanted to prevent.  
While this is a valid concern and one that could impact industries beyond the 
sports context,209 the collective nature of the decision-making authority of the NFLP 
is one that should be treated as a single entity.210  The purpose of the NFLP when it 
was formed was to create an interconnected interest amongst the owners in order to 
promote a unified economic strategy.211  The commissioner at the time of the NFLP’s 
creation, Pete Rozelle, thought that for the NFL to continue growing economically 
the owners needed to collectively unify its resources and have equity in the decisions 
 
 201.  Darren Rovell, NFL Teams Each Earn $226.4M From National Revenue Sharing, ESPN (Jul. 22, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/13290743/green-bay-packers-financial-records-reveal-2264m-nfl-revenue-
sharing. 
 202.  Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771–72 (1984).  
 203.  Oakland Raiders v. Nat’l Football League, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 204.  Id.  
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 197, 201 (2010). 
 207.  Id. at 200–01. 
 208.  Craig Wildfang, Ryan W. Marth, ‘American Needle’ has Repercussions Beyond Sports, THE NAT’L L.J. 
(Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.robinskaplan.com/~/media/pdfs/american%20needle%20has%20repercussions%20 
beyond%20sports.pdf?la=en.  
 209.   Id.  
210.                 Oakland Raiders, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260. 
 211.  Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 
731–32 (2010). 
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that were being made as profits would be equally shared amongst the teams.212  This 
commonality of pursuing a collective economic interest is a characteristic that is 
shared by single entities, not by independent decision-makers, as the individuals 
benefit from the prosperity of the whole.213  
The NFL is a single entity beyond the scope of § 1 because NFL teams do not 
compete against each other off the field, but instead, they operate to share an 
economic interest in collectively promoting the NFL.214  By ensuring that teams share 
substantial portions of their revenue, the NFL is able to achieve a competitive balance, 
which ultimately allows the NFL’s wealth to be maximized.215  The Supreme Court 
cites the dangers of using a profit-sharing argument as a means to escape scrutiny 
under § 1 and they are right to an extent, but the unified interest of the NFLP 
indicates that the NFL should be considered a single entity.216   
F.  Intellectual Property License 
Not only do the NFL teams have a shared interest in intellectual property, but the 
NFL has also continually licensed its intellectual property without interruption since 
1963.217  American Needle never disputed that the NFL and its individually owned 
teams collectively licensed intellectual property to promote a unified interest in 
professional football.218 Looking at the NFLP’s Articles of Incorporation, it clearly 
states that the individual teams formed the NFLP “[t]o conduct and engage in 
advertising campaigns and promotional ventures on behalf of the [NFL] and the 
member [teams].”219  There is no evidence to rebut the purpose of its creation, which 
is to unify the interests of the teams to promote one collective goal – the NFL.220 
Each of the factors described above provide substantial evidence that the NFL is 
to be considered a single entity.  Collectively, these factors illustrate that the NFL is 
one unified venture whose overarching goal is not to compete against each other but 
to “compete against other forms of entertainment.”221 
 
 212.  Id.  
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. at 752. 
 216.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 201 (explaining if sharing profits could escape § 1 scrutiny then any cartel 
would create a joint venture to exclusively sell its competing products). 
 217.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing the tradition of 
collective licensing as a means for it to continue today). 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 737. 
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VI.  ELIMINATION OF THE SINGLE ENTITY DEFENSE: IMPACT ON OTHER 
MAJOR SPORTS 
The central theme of the case law that has developed after American Needle is that 
professional sports leagues cannot avoid the threat of antitrust litigation.222  American 
Needle has opened the door for antitrust lawsuits by holding that the NFL is not a 
single entity and is, therefore, within the scope of § 1.223  Professional sports leagues 
have been unwilling to litigate substantial antitrust claims for fear of the ramifications 
that would result if its practices were deemed to be in violation.224   
As sports leagues have grown, so have the number of potential issues.  With sports 
leagues being subject to antitrust violations, there has been an increase in the threat 
of litigation, specifically surrounding the collective bargaining process and premium 
television agreements.225    
A.  Antitrust Litigation Used as a Bargaining Chip  
When a collective bargaining agreement’s (CBA) term ends without a new 
agreement, the parties can mutually agree to keep the current CBA in place and 
continue the negotiation process or initiate a work stoppage.226  A work stoppage 
typically occurs when the negotiations become contentious and the two sides seem 
to be moving further apart.227  One of two things can happen in a work stoppage: the 
owners can implement a lockout or the players can initiate a strike.228  When the 
owners assert a lockout, the owners impose a ban on the players from working in an 
official capacity – whether that be roster adjustments, games being played, free agent 
signings, or trade acquisitions.229  Conversely, with a strike, it is the players that 
impose the ban.230   
If a work stoppage is to occur, the time of year will dictate whether it is a lockout 
or a strike.231  During the season, players will strike to force the owners to incur 
 
222.       See infra Sections VI.A, VI.C. 
 223.  Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. 183, 202–03 (2010). 
 224.  See, e.g., Jeff Zalesin, MLB Fans Get Initial OK for TV Antitrust Settlement, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2016, 8:40 
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/750519/mlb-fans-get-initial-ok-for-tv-antitrust-settlement  (illustrating 
that MLB agreed to a settlement rather than litigating antitrust claims). 
 225.  See Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 477 (2013) (focusing on collective bargaining); Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 
105 F.Supp.3d 384, 388 (discussing exclusivity issues with television contracts). 
 226.  Nathaniel Grow, A Roadmap for a Potential MLB Work Stoppage, FANGRAPHS (Nov. 28, 2016), 
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/a-roadmap-for-a-potential-mlb-work-stoppage.  
 227.  Id.  
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. 
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substantial revenue losses as no games will be played.232  If the work stoppage occurs 
in the offseason, it is more likely that the owners will assert a lockout to gain an 
advantage in the CBA negotiations because it will freeze all acquisitions – meaning 
pending free agents are unable to sign lucrative deals.233  The longer the lockout 
occurs, the less time teams have to negotiate prior to the season beginning and if it 
continues into the season, players begin to miss paychecks.234  
In 2011, as the CBA terms for the NBA and NFL came to an end without a new 
deal, each of the league’s player associations, NFLPA and NBAPA, decertified235 from 
their respective leagues to retain the ability to file an antitrust suit against the 
owners.236   
The NBAPA was prompted to decertify because the NBA owners commenced a 
lockout.237 Decertification was a risky decision,238 but it provided the players with a 
significant amount of leverage.239  Decertification forced the hand of the owners either 
to come to an agreement on the terms of the new CBA or face antitrust litigation.240  
The players’ attempt to pursue antitrust litigation alleged that the owners were 
negotiating in bad faith and that they violated § 1 of the Sherman Act because the 
lockout “constituted an unlawful group boycott agreement among the thirty NBA 
teams.”241  
 
 232.  Nathaniel Grow, A Roadmap for a Potential MLB Work Stoppage, FANGRAPHS (Nov. 28, 2016), 
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/a-roadmap-for-a-potential-mlb-work-stoppage. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Decertification occurs when members dissociate from a union. Business Dictionary (2016), 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/decertification.html.  
 236.  Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 474 (2013). “Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. [established that] a union wishing to pursue an 
antitrust claim against management cannot escape the strictures of the non-statutory exemption until its labor 
dispute is ‘sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-bargaining process.’” Id. at 476.  
Decertification was necessary because the standard set in Brown required that to bring an antitrust lawsuit there 
must be a separation between labor law and antitrust law, which is accomplished through decertification. Id. 
 237.  Id. at 474, 477. 
 238.  Id. at 477 (noting the risks involved with decertification such as forgoing union-provided benefits like 
pension and health insurance). 
 239.  Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 477, 500 (2013). In 2011, the NFLPA received a court ruling that enjoined the owners from 
continuing their lockout. Nathaniel Grow, A Roadmap for a Potential MLB Work Stoppage, FANGRAPHS (Nov. 28, 
2016), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/a-roadmap-for-a-potential-mlb-work-stoppage. Later, this was 
overturned, but the threat of enjoinment provides the players with a significant amount of leverage. Id. 
Additionally, if the court was not willing to enjoin a lockout, the players would begin to accrue treble damages 
from the owners by filing suit – resulting in the players being awarded three times the wages lost during the 
lockout. Id.  
  240.       Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 496–97, 500 (2013). 
 241.  Id. at 497. 
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Before the antitrust litigation commenced, both the NFL and NBA signed new 
CBAs.242  Even though both leagues eventually came to an agreement, the threat of 
litigation still exists each time the next CBA is to be decided.243  Rather than leaving 
the parties to negotiate new terms through the collective bargaining process, the 
potential for antitrust litigation is being used as an end-around to implement 
favorable terms for the players.244 
Additionally, decertification provides the players with the ability to potentially 
defeat employer-imposed lockouts by petitioning the court for an injunction.245  This 
would cripple the owner’s ability to withhold players’ paychecks – taking away a key 
point of leverage for the owners, money.246  Antitrust law now reaches beyond its 
intended scope into areas where it was not intended, such as the collective bargaining 
process, because of American Needle.    
The threat of antitrust litigation is not just used in collective bargaining.  In 
February 2016, the NFL and Reebok had a class action lawsuit filed against them in 
California.247  The complaint alleged that the NFL and Reebok entered into a price-
fixing agreement, which drove up prices for NFL apparel to stifle competition,248 a 
per se violation under the Sherman Act.249  The settlement yielded $4.75 million, 
which will be used to “reimburse anyone in California who purchased an NFL-
branded jersey, hat, or shoes, within the state between Oct. 25, 2008 and April 1, 
2012.”250  After the settlement, the NFL and Reebok continued to deny any violation 
but released a statement saying they agreed to the settlement “‘to put to rest this 
 
 242.  Id. at 493, 497. 
 243.  In 2016, Major League Baseball saw an end to its current CBA. Nathaniel Grow, A Roadmap for a 
Potential MLB Work Stoppage, FANGRAPHS (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/a-roadmap-for-a-
potential-mlb-work-stoppage.  Fortunately, the terms of the new CBA were agreed upon just before the term 
ended, but there were significant concerns about the potential for a work stoppage and antitrust litigation. Id. 
 244.  Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 500 (2013). 
 245.  Id. at 495.  
 246.  Nathaniel Grow, A Roadmap for a Potential MLB Work Stoppage, FANGRAPHS (Nov. 28, 2016), 
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/a-roadmap-for-a-potential-mlb-work-stoppage.   
 247.  Michael A. Kakuk, NFL, Reebok Settle Antitrust Class Action for $4.75 Million, TOP CLASS ACTIONS: 
CONNECTING CONSUMERS TO SETTLEMENTS, LAWSUITS & ATTORNEYS (Feb. 29, 2016), https:// 
topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/329262-nfl-reebok-settle-antitrust-class-action-4-75-
million.  
 248.  Id. 
 249.  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 213 (1940) (concluding that price fixing 
unreasonably restricts trade and therefore a violation). 
 250.  Michael A. Kakuk, NFL, Reebok Settle Antitrust Class Action for $4.75 Million, TOP CLASS ACTIONS: 
CONNECTING CONSUMERS TO SETTLEMENTS, LAWSUITS & ATTORNEYS (Feb. 29, 2016), https:// 
topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/329262-nfl-reebok-settle-antitrust-class-action-4-75-
million. 
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controversy and avoid the risks inherent in complex litigation.’”251  The NFL, like all 
other sports leagues, understands how vulnerable an antitrust violation would make 
them and thus yield to any semi-legitimate complaint.  
B.  Major League Baseball’s Exemption 
While the NFL and NBA have had antitrust lawsuits filed against them, one sport is 
noticeably absent from such litigation, Major League Baseball (MLB).  Professional 
baseball is the only major American sport that has an antitrust exemption.252  In 1922, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes delivered the opinion in Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs that has provided MLB 
with an antitrust exemption for over ninety years.253  The Court concluded that MLB 
was a purely state activity and therefore did not come within the reach of federal 
antitrust laws.254 Acknowledging that in order for baseball games to be played players 
must travel across state lines, the Court stated that any inter-state activity was purely 
incidental.255   
Looking through the lens of modern day professional baseball, it is clear that 
professional baseball is not purely a state activity, but Justice Holmes’s decision 
continues to be upheld.256  MLB has enjoyed an expansive antitrust exemption for 
decades, but Congress has attempted, in recent years, to limit its coverage.257  
Congress enacted the Curt Flood Act of 1998 to enable professional baseball players 
the option to seek antitrust remedies.258  The Curt Flood Act’s limitation is confined 
solely to conduct that involves the employment of professional baseball players at the 
major league level.259  With such a limited reach, the Curt Flood Act provides no relief 
for a situation like American Needle.   
MLB’s antitrust exemption seems to be an anomaly that has withstood the test of 
time, but there has been extensive literature written about why MLB’s antitrust 
exemption should be repealed.260  Even with such extensive literature in favor of 
 
 251.  Id. (quoting the press release from the NFL and Reebok (emphasis added)).  
 252.  Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1922). 
 253.  Id.  
 254.  Id.  
 255.  Id. at 208–09. 
 256.  Toolson v. New York Yankees 346 U.S. 356, 356–57 (1953). 
 257.  The Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (2010). 
 258.  Id.  
 259.  Id.  
 260.  See, e.g., Hon. Connie Mack & Richard M. Blau, The Need for Fair Play: Repealing the Federal Baseball 
Antitrust Exemption, 45 FLA. L. REV. 201, 206–07 (illustrating why baseball’s antitrust exemption must be 
repealed).  
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repealing MLB’s antitrust exemption, the fact remains that Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs is still good law today.261  
C.  Legality of League-Wide Broadcasting and Blackout Rules 
As the popularity of professional sports has spread across the nation, the competition 
to broadcast professional sporting events has intensified.  In May of 2015, a class 
action antitrust lawsuit, Laumann v. NHL, was filed against the NHL and MLB 
challenging “territorial exclusivity” restraints placed on the leagues’ broadcasts.262  
The plaintiffs argued that the NHL and MLB conspired with regional sports networks 
to maintain systems of “territorial exclusivity” to limit consumers’ viewing options 
and inflate prices.263  This exclusivity has become an issue because consumers are 
forced to buy an entire package of games in order to see one specific team or game if 
they are located outside of a geographic market.264  This has significantly increased 
the cost from what they normally would pay to watch a single team.265  The threat of 
a potential antitrust violation against the NHL and MLB forced them to settle 
quickly.266  As a result, both the NHL and MLB now permit fans to watch their favorite 
teams play outside of the teams’ local markets and buy single team packages without 
having to pay extra for a league-wide bundle of games.267  
A similar case involving the NFL was litigated immediately after Laumann v. NHL.  
In July 2015, a major class action lawsuit was filed against the NFL and DirecTV in 
regard to its “NFL Sunday Ticket” package.268  The NFL is the only one of the four 
major sports leagues – baseball, hockey, basketball, and football – that has an 
“exclusive out of market broadcasting arrangement.”269  According to the plaintiffs in 
Ninth Inning Inc. dba The Mucky Duck v. National Football League, Inc., et al., the 
 
 261.  259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922). 
 262.  Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 105 F.Supp.3d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015). Plaintiffs alleged 
that MLB, the NHL and regional production networks, have “entered into agreements with multichannel video 
programming distributors—DirectTV and Comcast—that limit options, and increase prices, for baseball and 
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to plaintiffs, defendants’ multilateral agreements impose conditions of ‘territorial exclusivity’ that restrain 
individual teams … from selling their content directly to fans.” Id. 
 263.  Id. at 388, 394. 
 264.  Id. at 388. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Max Stendahl, NHL Settlement Approved in Broadcast Antitrust Case, LAW360 (Sept. 1, 2015, 2:18 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/697822/nhl-settlement-approved-in-broadcast-antitrust-case; Jeff Zalesin, 
MLB Fans Get Initial OK for TV Antitrust Settlement, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2016, 8:40 PM), https:// 
www.law360.com/articles/750519/mlb-fans-get-initial-ok-for-tv-antitrust-settlement. 
 267.  Id.  
 268.  Complaint at 1–2, Ninth Inning Inc. dba The Mucky Duck v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., et al., (C.D. 
Cal. 2015) (No. 2:15-cv-05261), 2015 WL 4294835. 
 269.  Id. at 1–2, 6. 
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arrangement’s exclusivity led to competition that was unfair for other providers such 
as Dish Network.270  The plaintiffs argue that since the NFL has a monopoly on the 
“creation, licensing, and distribution of NFL games” combined with DirecTV’s 
market power over commercial subscribers, its agreement monopolizes the market 
for NFL games, violating § 1 of the Sherman Act.271   
While Ninth Inning Inc.’s case has been terminated,272 it, along with Laumann v. 
NHL, illustrates that antitrust litigation is not going to diminish in the future.  If 
anything, antitrust litigation, especially in the sports industry, will increase due to the 
lasting effect of American Needle.  The threat of antitrust litigation will force the hand 
of league executives and its contracting parties to settle cases for fear of being deemed 
in violation of § 1, which could negatively impact the leagues’ past, present, and 
future contracts.273 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In American Needle, the Court failed to recognize that competition on the field 
between the NFL teams does not correlate to competition off the field.  Six factors 
provide substantial evidence that the NFL should be considered a single entity for 
purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act: (1) treatment of similarly structured entities 
outside of professional sports, (2) the evolution of the single entity defense applied 
in professional sports, (3) the source of value for each individual NFL trademark, (4) 
the impracticality of individually negotiating contracts with each specific team, (5) 
the NFL’s collective decision-making model, and (6) the NFL’s longstanding 
tradition of licensing its intellectual property since 1963.274   
The influential decision in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 
which held that the NFL is not a single entity and is, therefore, within the scope of § 
1 of the Sherman Act,275 has had a significant impact on the landscape of professional 
sports.  As a result of this decision, the single entity defense has been effectively 
extinguished, and the ramifications can be felt throughout professional sports, from 
the collective bargaining process to negotiating premium television agreements.276   
 
 
 270.  Id. at 5, 7. 
 271.  Id. at 41–42. 
272.        Docket, Ninth Inning Inc. dba The Mucky Duck v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., et al., (C.D. Cal. 2015) 
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